

























































The	 internet	 and	 24-hour	 news	 cycles	 have	 brought	 world	 attention	 to	 catastrophes	 like	 the	
Indian	 Ocean	 Tsunami	 (2004),	 Hurricane	 Katrina	 (2005),	 and	 the	 Fukushima	 Tsunami	 and	 Dai-ichi	
Nuclear	Accident	 (2011).	Scholars	credit	disasters	and	 their	coverage	 in	 the	media	with	an	 increase	 in	
the	 public	 perception	 of	 risk	 associated	with	 low-probability,	 high-consequence	 events	 (LPHCs).	With	
this	 change	 in	 perceptions,	 we	 anticipate	 subsequent	 changes	 in	 beliefs,	 preferences,	 and	 behaviors	
(Lupia	 and	 Menning	 2009).	 As	 people’s	 experiences	 and	 perceptions	 change	 during	 and	 after	 these	
critical	 events,	 we	 expect	 their	 preferences	 and	 beliefs	 to	 continually	 update	 (Druckman	 and	 Lupia	
2000).	We	also	expect	one’s	emotions	associated	with	LPHCs	to	drive	the	tendency	to	take	future	risks	
(Druckman	and	McDermott	2008).		
Many	 claim	 that	 the	 public	 always	 exaggerates	 the	 risks	 of	 LPHCs,	 particularly	 due	 to	media	
influence.	Yet	this	assertion	has	not	been	settled	in	the	literature.	Wahlberg	and	Sjoberg	(2000)	find	that	
among	heavy	media	users,	media	are	not	a	likely	causal	factor	in	personal	risk	perception,	and	that	risk	
perception’s	 link	 to	 behavior	 is	 uncertain.	 They	 also	 find	 no	 support	 for	 the	 argument	 that	 a	
disproportionate	 focus	 (in	 the	 media)	 is	 given	 to	 LPHCs.	 Leschine	 (2002)	 elaborates	 on	 how	 media	
reports	of	 critical	 events	 can	both	amplify	and	attenuate	 the	 social	perception	of	 risk	associated	with	
those	events.	
To	 date,	 however,	 little	 is	 understood	 about	 the	 effect	 of	 varying	 LPHC	 experience	 on	 risk	










about	 damages	 to	 their	 property	 and	 their	 likelihood	 of	 permanently	 living	 in	 their	 pre-disaster	
residence	 after	 displacement.	 Their	 answers	 were	 compared	 to	 those	 of	 respondents	 who	 were	 not	
directly	 affected	 by	 a	 hurricane,	 but	were	 posed	 a	 hypothetical	 hurricane.	 These	 non-evacuees	were	
randomly	 assigned	 a	 hurricane	 of	 varying	 intensity,	 and	 asked	 questions	 regarding	 their	 expected	
damages	and	likelihood	of	living	in	pre-disaster	residences	after	hypothetical	displacement.		
Those	in	the	hypothetical	group	exhibit	exaggerated	beliefs	and	opposite	decisions	of	those	who	
actually	 lived	 through	 either	 Hurricane	 Katrina	 or	 a	 disaster	 of	 lesser	 catastrophic	 import.	 Those	
assigned	 to	 low-intensity	 hurricane	 groups	 estimate	 a	 likelihood	 of	 sustaining	 hurricane	 damage	 at	
probabilities	approaching	those	of	Hurricane	Katrina	victims,	rather	than	comparable	to	the	likelihood	of	
damages	typically	caused	by	low-intensity	storms.	Those	in	medium	and	high	intensity	groups	estimate	
the	 likelihood	 of	 sustaining	 damages	 at	 levels	 extraordinarily	 higher	 than	 the	 average	 high-intensity	
hurricane	inflicts.	And	while	increasing	damages	make	Katrina	evacuees	more	resolved	to	return	to	and	
commit	 to	 living	 in	 their	 pre-disaster	 place	 of	 residence,	 the	 opposite	 effect	 is	 exhibited	 in	 the	
hypothetical	group,	who	are	 less	resolved	to	return	to	their	evacuated	residence	as	damages	increase.	
Despite	 the	 passage	 of	 one	 year	 and	 several	 storms	 between	 Katrina	 and	 the	 survey,	 non-evacuees	
generally	believed	any	hurricane	that	hit	them	would	cause	a	Katrina-level	catastrophe.		
This	 paper	 is	 unique	 in	 its	 power	 to	 demonstrate	 important	 belief,	 behavior,	 and	 intended	
behavior	 differences	 between	 people	 who	 directly	 experience	 a	 disaster	 and	 people	 who	 observe	 it	
filtered	 through	other	 sources	 of	 information.	My	 contribution	 lies	 in	 showing	 that	 the	 perception	 of	
disaster	is	causing	a	distortion	between	beliefs	and	plans,	on	the	hypothetical	side,	and	actual	decisions,	
in	reality.	This	distinction	is	important	for	three	key	reasons.	
First,	 most	 studies	 of	 risk	 amplification	 compare	 respondent	 beliefs	 about	 risk	 to	 expert	




nature	 of	 critical	 events	 prohibits	 the	 creation	 of	 painful	 and	 potentially	 traumatic	 stimuli	 to	 study	
subjects.	 By	 taking	 advantage	 of	 a	 quasi-experimental	 design,	 I	 am	 able	 to	 compare	 observation	 to	
experience.	 It	 is	 only	 in	 comparing	 the	 perceptions	 and	 intentions	 of	 observers	 to	 those	 of	 actual	
survivors	that	we	learn	the	type	and	level	of	distortion	taking	place	between	hypothesis	and	reality.	
Second,	we	know	that	emotions	affect	one’s	propensity	to	take	risks	(Druckman	and	McDermott	
2008),	 and	 that	 risk	 assessments	 can	 be	 manipulated	 by	 policymakers	 (Lupia	 and	 Menning	 2009).	
Debate	exists	over	 the	economic	and	political	prudence	of	 rebuilding	disaster-threatened	areas	 (Joyce	
2013;	Rozario	2010).	The	heightened	resolve	of	Katrina	and	Rita	evacuees	to	return	home,	even	a	year	
after	 the	 storm,	 is	un-desirable	 among	 some	policy	makers	 and	 disaster	managers	who	would	 rather	
citizens	 live	 in	 places	 less	 susceptible	 to	 catastrophic	 events	 (Birkland	 et	 al	 2003;	Public	 Broadcasting	
Service	2012;	Glaeser	2005).	As	observers	constitute	the	majority	of	voters	and	taxpayers,	it	is	important	
to	be	able	to	evaluate	their	beliefs	and	intentions	regarding	hypothetical	threats,	and	based	on	second-
hand	 information.	 If	 they	 differ	 radically	 from	 those	 built	 on	 the	 first-hand	 experiences	 of	 disaster	
evacuees,	genuine	conflicts	of	political	interest	may	result.		
Ultimately,	 this	distortion	challenges	our	ability	 to	make	policy	and	predictions	about	political	
behavior,	 an	 important	 challenge	 to	 recognize	 in	any	 situation	 for	which	government	 leaders	hope	 to	
plan,	but	cannot	wholly	simulate.	Learning	about	 individuals’	 risk	perceptions	 is	 important	to	planning	
recovery,	 which	 can	 in	 turn	 reduce	 the	 risk	 of	 subsequent	 disasters	 (Comfort	 et	 al	 2010).	 May	 and	
Birkland	(1994)	find	that	local	government	willingness	and	ability	to	undertake	risk-reduction	programs	
have	 less	to	do	with	previous	hazard	experience	and	more	to	do	with	 local	political	demands.	 If	 these	
demands	 are	 in	 any	 way	 a	 result	 of	 bystander	 observation,	 we	 must	 know	 how	 drastically	 those	
bystander	reactions	to	critical	events	diverge	from	the	reactions	of	actual	experience.	The	information	






Disasters	 are	 unplanned	 disruptions	 in	 social	 and	 political	 systems	 (based	 on	 Quarantelli,	
Lagadec,	 and	 Boin	 2006;	 also	 Perry	 2006).	 Both	man-made	 disasters,	 such	 as	 nuclear	 accidents,	 and	
natural	disasters,	such	as	hurricanes,	are	what	scholars	term	‘low-probability,	high-consequence	events,’	
or	LPHCs.	They	join	other	LPHCs	that	happen	rarely	but	often	carry	high	death	tolls,	such	as	genocides,	




and	Kasperson	 (1996)	 term	 the	 deviations	 social	 amplification,	meaning	 the	 exaggeration	of	 risk,	and	
attenuation,	 or	 the	 dampening	 of	 risk,	 compared	 to	 generally	 accepted	 estimates.	 Both	 phenomena	
occur	 as	 information	 is	 processed	 via	 a	 combination	 of	 personal	 experiences	 and	 second-hand	
information	sources,	such	as	the	media	(Leschine	2002).	The	change	 in	beliefs	about	risk	then	has	the	
potential	to	affect	preferences	(Druckman	and	Lupia	2000).	











disasters,	 to	 the	exclusion	of	more	common	risks	 like	smoking.	Evidence	shows	 that	both	 the	amount	
and	the	nature	of	media	coverage	are	powerful	predictors	of	public	knowledge	of	events	 that	amplify	
beliefs	 (Barabas	and	 Jerit	2009;	Nyhan	and	Reifler	2010),	 including	 risk	assessments	 (Gore	et	al	2005;	
Frewer,	Miles,	and	Marsh	2002).	In	other	words,	coverage	amplifies	observer	risk	assessments	the	more	
shocking	and	evocative	 it	 is,	and	the	more	plentiful	 it	 is.	One	mechanism	at	play	seems	to	be	that	 for	
observers	who	lack	personal	experience	with	LPHCs,	fear	and	uncertainty	combine	with	media	coverage	
to	 intensify	 risk	 assessments	 to	 levels	 far	 beyond	 those	 projected	 by	 experts	 (Wahlberg	 and	 Sjoberg	
2000;	Camerer	and	Kunreuther	1989;	Leschine	2002).		
In	 sum,	 observers	may	 glean	 a	 distorted	 perception	 of	 events	 based	 on	 selective	 journalism,	
reporter	error,	and	the	anxiety	and	trauma	depicted	 in	disaster	coverage	 (Izard	and	Perkins	2011;	 Jha	
and	Izard	2011;	Sommers	et	al	2006,	Atkeson	and	Maestas	2012),	and	when	not	tempered	by	personal	
experience,	 this	 perception	 can	 inflate	 one’s	 perception	 of	 risk.	 These	 new	 beliefs	 then	 affect	 future	
actions	by	causing	people	to	avoid	(or	plan	to	avoid)	situations	they	believe	are	risky	(Gigerenzer	2006).	
As	LPHCs	are	often	surrounded	by	intense	emotions	and	volatile	reactions,	studying	their	effects	can	be	








1) Observers	 of	 a	 LPHC	 that	 received	 media	 coverage	 either	 in	 large	 amounts	 or	 in	 a	
shocking/evocative	 nature	 are	 likely	 to	 have	 their	 risk	 assessments	 of	 similar	 LPHCs	 amplified	
compared	to	actual	survivor	experiences.	






Experiments	 on	 risk	 amplification	 and	 attenuation	 regarding	 disasters	 are	 rare,	 with	
methodological	 complications	 inherent	 in	 probing	 the	 questions	 outlined	 above.	 Research	 on	 beliefs,	
intentions,	and	disasters	is	difficult	to	conduct	for	at	least	four	reasons.	The	first	two	deal	with	research	
design.	 First,	 the	 unpredictability	 of	most	 LPHC	 events	makes	 it	 challenging	 to	 carry	 out	 studies,	 and	
unethical	to	conduct	most	experiments,	designed	to	explore	amplification	and	numbing	stimuli	(Frewer,	
Miles,	and	Marsh	2002;	Schlenger	and	Cohen	Sliver	2006).	Scholars	cannot	knowingly	assign	participants	




The	 second	 problem	 is	 a	 result	 of	 the	 first.	 To	 preserve	 random	 assignment,	 experiments	 on	
disaster-motivated	 beliefs	 and	 intentions	 often	 pose	 hypothetical	 disasters	 to	 randomly-assigned	
respondents,	typically	academic	convenience	samples	who	know	little	about	disasters	as	a	phenomenon	
(North	 and	Norris	 2006).	 Though	 internally	 valid,	 this	 situation	 threatens	 setting	 validity	 because	 ‘the	








The	 third	 and	 fourth	 problems	 relate	 to	 treatment	 effects.	 Recall	 that	 LPHCs	 can	 inflate	 risk	
perceptions,	 which	 in	 turn	 affect	 choices	 and	 behavior	 regarding	 risky	 situations	 (discussed	 above).	
Similarly,	in	LPHC-related	experiments	a	subject’s	estimation	of	her	behavior	may	be	exaggerated	due	to	
pretreatment	 by	 mass	 communications.	 Pretreatment	 occurs	 when	 ‘contamination	 from	 real-world	
experience’	 affects	 experimental	 outcomes	 (Gaines,	 Kuklinski,	 and	Quirk	 2007,	 p.	 12).	 Druckman	 and	
Leeper	(2012)	find	that	pretreatment	effects	can	be	just	as	influential	as	treatment	effects,	sometimes	
more	 so.	 This	 means	 that	 when	 media	 attention	 to	 a	 particular	 LPHC	 is	 high,	 subjects’	 beliefs	 and	
intentions	 are	 likely	 to	 change	 prior	 to	 receiving	 the	 experimental	 stimulus.	 We	 already	 know	 that	




Finally,	 public	 perceptions	 of	 the	 risks	 and	 impacts	 of	 these	 types	 of	 events	 are	 typically	










(Camerer	 and	 Kunreuther	 1989).	 The	 inability	 to	 find	 expert	 consensus	 increases	 the	 difficulty	 in	
estimating	the	degree	of	individual	or	collective	subject	divergence.	
Given	 these	 complications,	 laboratory	 experiments	 are	 ill-suited	 to	 examine	 most	 results	 of	
disaster	stimuli.	Survey	experiments,	however,	have	been	on	the	rise	as	a	research	tool	(Druckman	et	al	
2006)	due	to	 their	high	 internal	validity	and	external	validity	 (Barabas	and	Jerit	2010).	Below	 I	explain	
how	my	 experiment-style	 survey	 was	 designed	 to	 capitalize	 on	 these	 features	 while	 accommodating	
disaster-related	idiosyncrasies	and	investigating	the	hypotheses	outlined	above.	
THE	STUDY	
The	 2005	 hurricane	 season	 unleashed	 two	 of	 the	 largest,	 strongest,	 and	 most	 damaging	




3	 storm,	 having	 been	 noted	 the	most	 intense	 Atlantic	 Basin	 hurricane	 on	 record	 (Kurth	 and	 Burckel	
2006).	 Rita	 caused	 118	 deaths	 (ibid.),	 and	 displaced	 1.5	million	 people	 from	 the	 Houston	 area	 alone	
(250,000	of	which	were	evacuees	of	Hurricane	Katrina;	Stein	et	al	2011).		
Katrina	 and	 Rita	 also	 spurred	 a	 media	 event	 closely	 followed	 around	 the	 world.	 In	 both	 an	
Associated	 Press	 poll	 of	 U.S.	 news	 editors,	 and	 the	 Pew	 Research	 Center	 U.S.	 News	 Interest	 Index,	
Hurricane	Katrina	was	the	top	world	story	of	2005	(Kohut,	Allen,	and	Keeter	2005).	In	a	random	Gallup	
poll	 of	 U.S.	 adults	 in	 September	 2005,	 96%	 of	 respondents	 reported	 they	 were	 following	 reports	 of	
Katrina	and	 its	aftermath	either	very	closely	or	somewhat	closely	 (Gallup	2005).	Atkeson	and	Maestas	
(2012)	 document	 the	 evocative	 nature	 of	 the	 coverage	 and	 its	 effectiveness	 in	 focusing	 national	







Sampling	 International,	 which	 administered	 an	 opinion	 survey	 to	 residents	 of	 hurricane-threatened	
areas	along	 the	US	Gulf	and	Southeast	Atlantic	coastlines	 in	September	2006.3	 	The	study	 features	an	
Internet-based	 comparison	 among	 non-evacuees	 of	 the	 2004-2006	 hurricane	 seasons,	 as	 well	 as	

















3	 Hurricane-threatened	 areas	were	 defined	 as	 containing	 respondents	with	 registered	 addresses	 in	 a	 county	 or	






participation	 via	 email.	We	 chose	 an	 internet	 sampling	 frame	 to	 be	 able	 to	 reach	 as	many	 displaced	
evacuees	as	possible,	during	a	 time	when	postal	and	telephone	services	had	still	not	been	completely	
restored	to	the	hurricane-affected	areas.	Internet	services	were	the	first	communication	lines	available	
after	 Katrina	 and	 Rita,	 however,	 and	 email	 addresses	were	 functional	 regardless	 of	 physical	 location.	
Contacting	 approximately	 75,000	 people	 randomly	 within	 our	 geographic	 restriction,	 we	 cut	 off	 the	
survey	 upon	 receipt	 of	 7,024	 responses.	 Since	 a	 non-response	 could	 indicate	 either	 ineligibility	 or	
unavailability,	 and	 the	 hurricanes	 and	 displacement	 precluded	 us	 from	 knowing	 the	 reason	 for	
nonresponse,	we	elected	to	treat	all	nonresponses	as	‘unknown	eligibility,’	the	most	restrictive	eligibility	
estimate	 possible	 (Smith	 2009).	 This	 gives	 an	 AAPOR-1	 response	 rate	 of	 9.4%.	 Online	 appendix	 has	
further	details	on	sample	collection	and	characteristics.		
We	randomly	assigned	each	of	the	7024	respondents	a	hypothetical	hurricane.	These	hurricanes	
varied	 on	 two	 dimensions:	 category	 of	 intensity,	 and	 probability	 of	 making	 landfall	 at	 or	 near	 the	
respondent’s	 residence.	 Each	 dimension	 contained	 three	 options:	 category	 of	 intensity	 could	 be	
Category	1,	Category	3,	or	Category	5;	probability	of	making	landfall	could	be	20%,	50%,	or	80%.5	As	a	
respondent’s	hypothetical	hurricane	had	one	of	three	 intensities,	and	one	of	three	probabilities,	there	




for	 a	 hurricane	 during	 the	 2004-2006	 seasons	 were	 considered	 ‘Disaster	 Evacuees,’	 and	 were	 asked	
																																								 																				
4	 Survey	 Sampling	 International	 (SSI)	 is	 a	 respected	 survey	 firm	 similar	 to	Knowledge	Networks.	 The	agency	has	














random	 assignment	 is	 no	 longer	 pertinent,	 other	 than	 to	 assess	 the	 randomness	 of	 the	 survey	
distribution	 itself.	 Survivors	 of	 other	 hurricanes	 during	 the	 2004-2005	 seasons	 are	 dropped	 from	 the	
sample.		
The	 remaining	 4695	 (66.84%)	 are	 considered	 ‘Disaster	 Bystanders.’	 These	 respondents	 were	
asked	questions	about	their	expected	experiences	and	behavior	with	respect	to	a	hypothetical	hurricane	








6	 This	 number	was	 just	 above	 the	budget	 for	 the	 study,	which	allotted	 for	 7000	 responses.	 	 Because	 the	entire	
state	of	Florida	fits	within	the	hurricane-threatened	definition,	responses	from	Florida	were	restricted	to	2500.	At	
the	 time	of	 the	 study,	SSI	had	not	 sampled	 the	Katrina-affected	area	and	was	 interested	 to	 see	how	the	survey	
would	fare,	though	there	was	no	idea	how	many	Katrina/Rita	evacuees	would	actually	respond.	
7	Another	771	reported	evacuating	for	other	major	hurricanes	of	those	seasons:	Hurricanes	Charley	(254),	Frances	










well	 as	 the	 proximity	 of	 landfall.	 Then	 the	 bystanders	 are	 compared	 to	 each	 other,	 allowing	
experimental	 conditions	 to	 vary	 within	 the	 Bystander	 Set.	 OLS	 regression	 allows	 assessment	 of	 the	
effects	of	intensity,	probability,	and	their	interaction.	
Bystanders’	damage	estimates	are	 then	utilized	 to	analyze	 the	 second	 issue,	 the	prediction	of	
the	 likelihood	 of	 living	 in	 a	 hurricane-threatened	 area	 after	 the	 hurricane	 occurs.	 Bystanders’	










The	 decision	 to	 evacuate	 is	 similarly	 non-random,	 and	 not	 entirely	 dependent	 on	 the	 critical	
event	 itself.	 Rather,	 evacuation	 depends	 on	 group	 characteristics	 and	 other	 factors.	 Previous	 disaster	
experience,	risk	of	disaster,	and	reliability	of	public	services	dictate	evacuation	decisions	by	conditioning	
one’s	 perceptions	 of	whether	 or	 not	 evacuating	 is	worthwhile	 (Perry	 1983;	Grothmann	 and	Reusswig	
2004).	Sources	of	 information	such	as	 television,	 radio,	newspapers,	or	 friends	 lend	different	 levels	of	
16	
 




In	 light	 of	 these	 non-random	 vulnerabilities	 and	 decisions,	 we	 must	 take	 care	 below	 when	
interpreting	differences	between	Evacuees	and	Bystanders.	Bystanders	are	respondents	who	were	not	
in	 the	path	of	 any	hurricane.	Evacuees	 are	 respondents	who	were	 in	 the	path	of	 Katrina	or	Rita,	 and	
evacuated.	Simple	difference-of-means	comparisons	on	key	variables	are	presented	initially,	then	group	
characteristics	are	controlled	for	subsequently.	Though	I	focus	on	the	differences	between	sets	due	to	




Personal	 damage	 from	a	disaster	 can	 include	physical	 injury,	 loss	 of	work,	 the	death	of	 loved	
ones,	and	psychological	or	traumatic	stress	(see	Galea	et	al	2005;	Versporten	et	al	2009;	Plyer,	Warren,	
and	 Bonaguro	 2007).	 Overall	 damages	 to	 private	 and	 public	 property	 have	 been	 estimated	 by	 the	
National	Oceanic	 and	Atmospheric	Administration	 at	 a	 total	 of	 $125	billion	 for	Hurricane	Katrina	 and	
$16.0	billion	for	Hurricane	Rita	(2012	US$	dollars;	Lott	et	al	2013),	not	including	damages	to	the	fishing,	
gas,	 tourism,	 or	 farming	 industries.	 In	 the	 2009	 American	 Housing	 Survey	 for	 the	 New	 Orleans	
Metropolitan	 Area,	 74%	 of	 New	Orleans	 homeowners	 reported	 damage	 to	 their	 homes	 by	 Hurricane	
Katrina.	 Just	 over	 40%	of	 these	 reported	 ‘major’	 damage,	 defined	 by	 the	 Census	 Bureau	 as	 requiring	
repairs	of	$15,000	or	more	(US	Census	Bureau	2011).		
	 It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 damages	 caused	 by	 Katrina	 versus	 Rita.	
Katrina	was	 remarkable	 in	 terms	of	damages	because	 it	 caused	more	 than	 four	 times	 the	damages	of	
17	
	























9	 At	 the	 time,	 Hurricane	 Andrew	 (1992)	 was	 the	 second	 costliest	 hurricane	 on	 record,	 causing	 $27	 billion	 in	






closer	 in	 size.	Meanwhile,	 Bystanders	 are	more	 than	 four	 times	 as	 likely	 to	 believe	 they	 will	 sustain	
property	damages	as	Rita	evacuees	actually	are	to	sustain	them	(.30/.07=4.29;	|z|=15.18;	p	<	.01).	
	 We	 begin	 to	 see	 a	 pattern	 emerge.	 Bystander	 estimates	 regarding	 their	 own	 hypothetical	
situation	 is	 somewhat	 comparable	 to	 that	which	was	experienced	by	Hurricane	Katrina	Evacuees,	 but	
quite	exaggerated	compared	to	 that	which	was	experienced	by	Hurricane	Rita	Evacuees.	As	Hurricane	
Katrina	 was	 such	 a	 drastic	 departure	 from	 other	 hurricanes	 in	 terms	 of	 damages,	 to	 exceed	 even	
Katrina’s	damage	probabilities	shows	a	heightened	belief	of	damages,	and	a	heightened	perception	of	
risk,	compared	to	evidence	seen	in	the	natural	world.	
	 Table	 4	 reports	 regression	 results	 for	 the	 two	 measures	 of	 damages	 (MLE	 logit	 for	 the	
dichotomous	 outcome,	 OLS	 for	 the	 level	 of	 damages).	 Model	 (1)	 examines	 the	 effects	 of	 Evacuee	
experience	 on	 the	 likelihood	 of	 sustaining	 damages.	 Results	 conform	 to	 the	 difference-of-means	 test	
results:	 Katrina	and	Rita	Evacuees	are	 less	 likely	 to	experience	damages	 than	Bystanders	believe	 they	
themselves	would,	 if	 in	a	hurricane	(both	p	<	.01).	The	effect	of	any	Evacuee	experience	is	captured	in	














	 Model	(3)	 includes	 interactions	of	hurricane	intensity	and	probability,	to	see	whether	 intensity	





	 Interpreting	 the	 interaction	 terms	 and	 joint	 effects	 in	Models	 (3)	 –	 (4)	 will	 be	 as	 follows.	 In	
Model	(4),	the	coefficient	on	Hurricane	Category	–	5	indicates	that	Bystanders	in	the	‘Category	–	5,	20%	
probability’	hypothetical	group	are	significantly	more	 likely	than	Bystanders	 in	the	 ‘Category	–	1,	20%’	
group	to	believe	they	will	sustain	damages	(1.77,	p	<	.01).	‘Joint	Significance	of	Category	5’	indicates	that	
all	 Bystanders	 assigned	 a	 Category	 –	 5	 hurricane	 are	 significantly	 more	 likely	 than	 all	 Bystanders	
assigned	 a	 Category	 –	 1	 hurricane	 to	 believe	 they	 will	 sustain	 damages	 (1.50,	 p	 <	 .01).	 The	 same	
interpretation	can	be	applied	to	Category	–	3	coefficients.	Similarly,	the	coefficients	on	Katrina	and	Rita	
experience	 indicate	 that	 Katrina	 Evacuees	 (-.86,	 p	 <	 .01)	 and	 Rita	 Evacuees	 (-1.94,	 p	 <	 .01)	 are	 each	
significantly	 less	 likely	 to	 sustain	 damages	 than	 Bystanders	 expect	 themselves	 to	 be,	 while	 the	
coefficient	 on	 Joint	 Significance	 of	 Experience	 signifies	 that	all	 Evacuees	 are	 significantly	 less	 likely	 (-
2.80,	p	<	.01)	to	sustain	damages	than	Bystanders	expect	themselves	to	be.	
																																								 																				
11	 Although	 a	 pure	 experiment	would	not	 need	 to	 account	 for	 the	 effects	 of	 intervening	or	mitigating	 variables	
(Mutz	2011,	pp.	123-126),	 respondents	were	non-randomly	assigned	 into	sets	based	on	where	they	were	at	 the	
time	 of	 the	 hurricanes.	 This	 fourth	model	 therefore	 includes	 basic	 socio-demographic	measures	 to	 ensure	 that	
differences	between	the	samples	will	not	confound	analysis	of	the	treatment	effects.	In	particular,	these	controls	
help	 avoid	 the	 ‘White	Male	 Effect,’	 a	 pattern	 noticed	 among	white	males,	who	 uniquely	 down-weight	 risk	 and	




	 Relationships	 among	 intensity,	 probability,	 and	 experience	 are	 perhaps	 best	 understood	 by	
examining	marginal	effects.	Figure	1	depicts	marginal	effects	of	hurricane	 intensity	on	expectations	of	
sustaining	damages,	using	Model	(4).	The	top	(solid	green)	line	represents	the	predicted	probabilities	of	
Bystanders	 in	 the	 Category-5	 group,	 for	 the	 landfall	 probabilities	 of	 20%,	 50%,	 and	 80%.	 The	middle	
(dotted	 red)	 and	 bottom	 (dashed	 blue)	 lines	 represent	 the	 same	 increase	 in	 probabilities	 for	 the	




Hypothesis	 2.	 Further,	 Evacuees	 are	 significantly	 less	 likely	 to	 experience	 damages	 than	 Bystanders	
predict	for	themselves.	Katrina	evacuees	had	a	14%	chance	of	experiencing	damages,	compared	to	the	
28%	 chance	 of	 damages	 expected	 by	 Bystanders	 given	 a	 Category-3	 hurricane.	 Hurricane	 Rita	
respondents	had	a	6%	chance	of	experiencing	damages,	 less	than	even	the	10.6%	chance	expected	by	
Bystanders	imagining	a	Category-1	hurricane,	which	is	two	categories	less	severe	than	Hurricane	Rita.		
	 These	 findings	 are	 remarkable	 considering	 the	 extent	 of	 damage	 Katrina	 inflicted.	 For	
Bystanders	 to	 believe	 they	 are	more	 likely	 to	 experience	 damages	 than	 Katrina	 victims,	 they	 believe	
themselves	 in	 a	 situation	 more	 risky	 than	 a	 hurricane	 four	 times	 more	 costly,	 and	 ten	 times	 more	
deadly,	 than	 any	 hurricane	 since	 prior	 to	WWII.	Damages	 similar	 to	 those	 from	Rita	 are	more	 typical	
according	 to	 previous	 history,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 Rita	 approached	 record-breaking	 barometric	
pressure	and	overall	 size	while	 in	 the	Gulf	of	Mexico.	Yet	 the	 likelihood	of	experiencing	damages	as	a	






hypothetical	 group	 the	 same	 strength	 as	 Rita	 (Category-3)	 were	 the	 likes	 of	 which	 only	 the	 costliest	
hurricane	in	history	had	ever	inflicted.	
	 In	 sum,	hypothetical	hurricanes	elicit	 statistically	 significant	and	substantively	 large	effects.	As	






live	 in	 one’s	 place	 of	 residence	 after	 a	 disaster.	 Return-migration	 patterns	 of	 displaced	 evacuees	 are	
never	certain,	and	have	been	studied	after	events	such	as	civil	and	internal	conflict	and	natural	disasters.	
Scholars	speculate	that	migration	is	based	on	attraction	to	population	centers	(Warin	and	Svaton	2008;	
Helliwell	 1997;	 Lewer	 and	 Van	 den	 Berg	 2008;	 Plane	 1984),	 diaspora	 contacts	 (Moore	 and	 Shellman	
2007),	 socio-economic	status	 (Smith	et	al	2006),	housing	damage	 (Fussell,	Sastry,	and	VanLandingham	
2010),	and	network	ties	(Landry	et	al	2007;	Groen	and	Polivka	2008).	
	 For	some	areas	of	the	country,	disasters	spurred	by	natural	hazards	are	likely	to	recur.	Annually,	
the	 Gulf	 Coast	 is	 exposed	 to	 hurricanes,	 Southern	 California	 experiences	 wildfires,	 and	 the	 southern	
plains	states	expect	tornados.	The	choice	to	live	in	these	areas	has	implications	for	resource	allocation	
and	public	health	efforts.	The	decision	of	where	to	 live	after	a	catastrophic	event	 is	 thus	 important	to	
political	scientists,	economists,	demographers,	sociologists,	and	policymakers.	
Measuring	Beliefs	and	Intentions	










damages	 in	 the	 range	 of	 $15,000,	 they	 were	 told	 the	 hypothetical	 hurricane	 inflicted	 ‘structural’	
damages	to	their	home.	They	were	also	told	they	would	be	able	to	fix	the	damage	with	insurance	funds,	
and	then	asked	whether	they	would	continue	to	live	in	the	area	where	their	home	was	damaged.		
Evacuees	 were	 asked	 their	 intentions	 of	 living	 (or	 continuing	 to	 live)	 in	 the	 area	 they	 had	





How	well	do	 the	estimates	of	 the	Bystander	Set	 correspond	 to	Evacuees’	experience?	Table	5	
reports	 t-tests	 for	 the	 Location	 Issue.	 Bystanders	 are	 26%	 less	 likely	 to	 see	 themselves	 living	 in	 the	





13	 Classifications	 based	 on	 2005	 categories,	 though	 they	 have	 changed	 slightly	 (US	 Department	 of	 Housing	 and	
Urban	Development	2006;	Road	Home	Program	2012).		
14	Measured	this	way,	probability	of	living	in	disaster	area	merges	people	who	have	and	have	not	returned;	I	do	so	
in	 order	 to	 not	 seriously	 undermine	 the	 analysis	with	 selection	 bias.	 Additional	 analysis	 yields	 the	 same	 results	
when	 either	 omitting	 the	 902	 displaced	 evacuees,	 or	 evaluating	 only	 the	 902	 displaced	 evacuees,	 instead	 of	









	 Table	 7	 displays	 Logit	 MLE	 estimates	 of	 intentions	 to	 live	 in	 the	 pre-disaster	 area.	 Since	
Bystanders	 were	 told	 the	 hypothetical	 hurricane	 had	 indeed	 passed	 over	 their	 area,	 ‘probability	 of	
making	 landfall’	 and	 ‘category	 of	 intensity’	 are	 no	 longer	 covariates.	 Instead,	 that	 information	 is	
incorporated	 into	 each	 Bystander’s	 damages	 forecast.	 Covariates	 for	Models	 (5)-(8)	 thus	 include	 the	
Katrina/Rita	experience,	adding	damage	levels	 in	Model	(6),	then	the	 interaction	between	Katrina/Rita	
experience	and	damages	in	Model	(7),	and	socio-demographic	controls	in	Model	(8).	
	 A	word	about	 interpretation	for	Models	(7)-(8)	might	be	helpful.	Due	to	the	 interaction	terms,	
the	coefficient	for	each	level	of	damages	represents	the	effect	of	that	level	of	damages	on	the	likelihood	
of	 living	 in	 the	 disaster	 area,	 as	 compared	 to	 the	 base	 level	 (cosmetic),	 for	 Bystanders	 only.	 The	
coefficient	for	Katrina	experience	represents	the	difference	in	the	likelihood	of	living	in	the	disaster	area	












not	 true	 for	 Evacuees,	 for	whom	 the	 likelihood	of	 living	 in	 the	 disaster	 area	 increases	with	 damages.	
Katrina	 Evacuees	 experiencing	 structural	 damage	 are	 significantly	more	 likely	 to	 plan	 on	 living	 in	 the	
area	 than	Bystanders	 (1.45;	p	<	 .01),	and	the	difference	only	widens	as	damages	grow	(2.20;	p	<	 .01).	




those	 imagining	 a	 hypothetical	 hurricane.	 Katrina	 Evacuees	 are	 significantly	more	 likely	 to	 live	 in	 the	
disaster	area	(3.81;	p	<	.01)	than	Bystanders,	as	are	Rita	Evacuees	(4.22;	p	<	.01).		
Interactive	effects	are	perhaps	most	easily	seen	in	Figure	2,	which	depicts	the	marginal	effects	
of	 the	 varying	 levels	 of	 damages,	 separated	 into	 groups	 for	 Bystanders,	 Katrina	 Evacuees,	 and	 Rita	
Evacuees.	 Katrina	 and	 Rita	 Evacuees	 (the	 dotted	 and	 dashed	 lines,	 top	 and	 middle)	 are	 not	 exactly	
parallel,	but	do	follow	the	same	general	path,	beginning	with	a	probability	over	70%	(72%	for	Katrina,	
81%	 for	 Rita),	 increasing	 in	 that	 probability	 to	 79%	 and	 86%,	 respectively	 (although	 not	 statistically	





	 Bystanders	 are	 not	 simply	 exaggerating	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 disaster	 experience	when	 they	
imagine	 it.	 They	 are	 imagining	 the	 effects	 to	 be	more	 dramatic,	 and	 their	 reactions	 to	 be	 in	 the	
opposite	 direction,	 of	 those	 experienced	 and	 exhibited	 by	 people	 who	 actually	 live	 through	 a	






In	 a	 controlled	 experiment,	 decisions	 can	 appear	 reasonable	 and	 predictably	 motivated	 by	
treatments.	Those	in	the	Bystander	Set	predicted	a	greater	likelihood	of	damages	as	their	hypothetical	
hurricane	grew	in	intensity,	and	decreased	their	predicted	likelihood	of	returning	to	the	disaster-stricken	
place	of	 residence	as	 the	damage	to	 their	home	 increased.	On	the	surface	these	seem	 like	sound	and	
appropriate	beliefs	and	intentions.	And	yet	the	responses	do	not	mirror	the	experiences	and	intentions	
of	actual	evacuees	who	lived	through	hurricanes	of	similar	intensity,	or	even	greater	intensity,	than	the	




of	 bystanders,	 the	 self-assessed	 intention	of	 returning	 is	 similar	 to	 an	 attitude,	 and	we	 are	unable	 to	
assess	whether	that	intention	lines	up	with	actual	behavior	for	any	particular	respondent.	Fishbein	and	
Ajzen’s	 Theory	 of	 Reasoned	Action	 (1975)	 explains	 how	one’s	 attitude	 toward	 an	 act	 is	more	 able	 to	
predict	 actual	 behavior	 than	 one’s	 attitude	 toward	 an	 object.	 This	 suggests	 that	 at	 the	 least,	
assessments	 of	 the	 likelihood	 of	 living	 in	 an	 area	will	 be	more	 reliable	 predictors	 of	 that	 action	 than	
assessments	of	 risk	would	be	of	 true	hurricane	 risk	 (also	Lindell	and	Prater	2002;	Terpstra	and	Lindell	
2012).	 Still,	 it	 would	 be	 unwise	 to	 use	 the	 stated	 resettlement	 intentions	 as	 concrete	 resettlement	
predictors.	 We	 can,	 however,	 compare	 the	 intended	 behaviors	 of	 the	 two	 groups	 (evacuee	 and	
bystander)	to	each	other.	The	results	do	not	change	if	including	evacuees	who	have	definitively	decided	
whether	 to	 return	 (see	 “Measuring	 Beliefs	 and	 Intentions,”	 p.	 20),	 and	 since	 the	 intended	 behavior	










world	 populations.	 Even	 if	 these	 samples	 are	 only	 representative	 of	 Gulf	 Coast	 residents,	 we	 can	
generalize	about	beliefs	and	intentions	based	on	hypothetical	versus	experienced	events.	
Third,	 the	 political	 disruption	 caused	 by	 disasters	 is	 not	 an	 everyday	 situation,	 and	Hurricane	
Katrina	was	not	an	everyday	disaster.	But	the	disaster	context	is	not	atypical.	The	requirement	is	not	to	
exactly	simulate	real-life	situations,	but	rather	‘to	see	whether	change	in	the	independent	variable	(by	
whatever	means)	 produces	 change	 in	 the	 dependent	 variable’	 (Mutz	 2011,	 p.	 93).	My	 design	 is	 thus	
useful	 in	 that	 it	manipulates	 independent	variables	 (disaster	 intensity)	and	 takes	advantage	of	natural	
variation	(disaster	experience)	to	gauge	subsequent	change	in	the	dependent	variables	of	interest.	
Additionally,	 these	 models	 do	 not	 explicitly	 estimate	 attention	 to	 media	 coverage.	 A	 self-
reported	measure	on	 the	attention	 the	 respondent	paid	 to	events	 surrounding	Hurricane	Katrina	was	









their	 surveys.	We	 do	 know	 that	 respondents	were	 primed	with	 preliminary	 questions	 regarding	 their	
knowledge	of,	concern	for,	and	attention	to	events	surrounding	Hurricane	Katrina,	so	we	have	reason	to	
believe	it	was	not	far	from	their	minds.	Even	if	thinking	of	something	else,	this	should	not	detract	from	





probability,	 high-consequence	 events	 have	 systematically	 different	 beliefs	 and	 intentions	 from	 those	
who	experience	that	event	first-hand?	On	this	question,	the	findings	are	clear.	Bystanders	and evacuees	






	 First,	 we	 learn	 that	 it	 is	 only	 in	 comparing	 the	 Bystanders	 to	 the	 Evacuees	 that	 we	 see	 the	
magnitude	 of	 Bystander	 amplification.	 Sans	 the	 ability	 to	 compare	 hypothetical-disaster	 responses	 to	
real-disaster	responses,	we	would	run	the	risk	of	drawing	 inferences	about	beliefs	and	 intentions	that	
only	represented	the	Bystanders’	perspective.	More	importantly,	considering	many	researchers	are	also	




	 The	 second	 reason	 is	 relevant	 to	 policy.	 Results	 find	 an	 opposite	 intended	 movement	 of	
Bystanders,	as	opposed	to	Evacuees,	based	on	damages.	As	hypothetical	damages	rise	 for	Bystanders,	






home	 areas,	 so	 that	 they	 cannot	 make	 the	 appropriate	 decision	 to	 leave.	 Comparing	 Bystanders	 to	
Evacuees	in	a	sample	then	becomes	important	precisely	because	of	the	difference	the	lack	of	experience	
elicits.	
The	 implication	 is	 that	hypothetical	 situations	 in	 surveys	 can	artificially	 cue	 rationality;	people	
will	apply	risk	assessments,	costs/benefits,	and	rational	behavior.	But	when	one	personally	lives	through	
a	 catastrophic	 event,	 even	 a	 year	 afterward	 different	 cues	 appear	 to	 be	 operating.	 Based	 on	 strictly	
experimental	 results,	 we	 might	 artificially	 conclude	 that	 respondents	 are	 rational	 because	 of	 their	
response	to	hypothetical	cues,	when	real	cues	in	ordinary	life	elicit	different	responses.		
Finally,	 the	 difference	 is	 notable	 because	 in	 general	 we	 expect	 hypothetical	 catastrophes	 in	
surveys	to	be	moderations	of	reality,	rather	than	amplifications.	To	a	respondent	sitting	at	a	computer,	a	
survey	 is	 unlikely	 to	 truly	 simulate	 a	 catastrophic	 experience.	 Yet	 the	 repeated	 distinction	 evidenced	
between	Bystanders	and	Evacuees,	across	hypothetical	damage	groups	and	Evacuee	groups,	suggests	a	










































































































































































































































Table 1. Assignment of Treatments and Distribution of Respondents 
Panel A. Distribution of Survey Experiment  Group (Non-Evacuee ‘Bystanders’) 
Hurricane Probability of 
Landfall 
Hurricane Category of Intensity 
1 % 3 % 5 % 
20% 510 (0.08) 512 (0.08) 508 (0.08) 
50% 485 (0.08) 546 (0.09) 555 (0.09) 
80% 549 (0.09) 494 (0.08) 491 (0.08) 
  1544 (0.25) 1552 (0.25) 1554 (0.25) 
              







    Katrina Rita   
  Experienced Katrina only 582   (0.09)   
  Experienced Rita only   683 (0.11)   
 Grand 
Total 
Experienced Katrina and 
Rita   311 (0.05)   
 Total 582 994 (0.25)     6226 
Notes: Grand Total is sum of all column totals. Cell values are the number of respondents 
from the survey study who fall into each category (values in parentheses give the proportion 





Table 2. Major 2004-2005 Hurricane Damages Compared to Hurricane Katrina 
Hurricane (Year) Monetary Damages Fraction of Katrina Damages 
Charley (2004) $15 billion 12% 
Frances (2004) $9 billion 7.2% 
Ivan (2004) $14 billion 11.2% 
Jeanne (2004) $7 billion 5.6% 
Dennis (2004) $2 billion 1.6% 
Katrina (2005) $125 billion 100% 
Rita (2005) $16 billion 12.8% 
Wilma (2005) $16 billion 12.8% 





Table 3. Survey and Comparison Effects: Damage 
Probabilities, Difference-of-Proportions 
 Probability of 
Sustaining Damages 
 Mean s.e. n 
Bystanders 0.30 0.01 4652 
Evacuees (all) 0.10 0.01 1438 
Difference -0.20 0.13 6090 
| Sig. test value | 15.21 0.10  
p - value 0.00   
    
Bystanders 0.30 0.01 4669 
Katrina Evacuees (only) 0.17 0.02 510 
Difference -0.13 0.02 5179 
| Sig. test value | 6.06   
p - value 0.00   
    
Bystanders 0.30 0.01 4674 
Rita Evacuees (all) 0.07 0.01 928 
Difference -0.24 0.02 5602 
| Sig. test value | 15.18   
p - value 0.00     
	
	 	
